The Principles of STATE and GOVERNMENT in ISLAM
By Muhammad Asad
Chapters: The Issue before Us | Terminology and Historical Precedent | Government by Consent and Council | Relationship between Executive and Legislature | The Citizens and the Government | Conclusion |
Chapter II
TERMINOLOGY AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
Misapplication of Western Terms
One of the main reasons for the confusion regarding the idea of the Islamic state is the indiscriminate application—both by the upholders and the critics of this idea—of Western political terms and definitions to the entirely different concept of Islamic polity. Not infrequently we find in the writings of modern Muslims the assertion that "Islamic is democratic" or even that it aims at the establishment of a "socialist" society; whereas many Western writers refer to an alleged "totalitarianism" in Islam which must necessarily result in dictatorship. Such superficial attempts at political definition are not only mutually contradictory, and therefore of no practical value for the purposes of a serious discussion, but also carry with them the danger of looking at the problems of Muslim society from the angle of Western historical experiences alone and, thus, of envisaging developments which may be justifiable or objectionable—depending on the viewpoint of the observer—but may be wholly out of place within the world-view of Islam. One should always remember that when the European or American speaks of "democracy," "liberalism," "socialism," "theocracy," "parliamentary government," and so forth, he uses these terms within the context of Western historical experience.
Within this context, such terms have not merely their legitimate place but are also easily understandable: they immediately evoke mental pictures of what has actually happened or might conceivably happen in the course of the West's historical development, and can therefore survive the changes to which the passing of time subjects all human concepts. More than that: the very fact of conceptual change—the fact that many of the political terms current today bear a meaning different from that originally given to them—is ever-present in the mind of a Western thinker; and this awareness confers upon him the ability to view his political terminology as something that is in constant need of revision and readjustment. This flexibility of thought disappears, however, as soon as a political concept is taken over ready-made by people who belong to a very different civilization and have, therefore, passed through different historical experiences. To such people, the political term or institution in question appears, as a rule, to be endowed with an absolute, unchanging meaning which does not take into consideration the fact of its historical evolution and, consequently, contributes to the very rigidity of political thought which the new conceptual acquisition had sought to remove.
Take, for instance, the term "democracy." In the West, it is still largely—though by no means wholly—used in the sense given to it by the French Revolution, namely, the principle of socio-economic equality of all citizens, and of government by the entire adult population through its elected representatives, on the basis of "one person, one vote." In its wider connotation, this term implies the people's unrestricted right to legislate by a majority vote on all matters of public concern. Thus, the "will of the people" is set forth, theoretically at least, as something that is free of all external limitations, sovereign unto itself and responsible only to itself. It is obvious that this concept of democracy is vastly different from that held by the originators of the term—the ancient Greeks. To them, the "rule of, or by, the people" (which is what the word "democracy" connotes) implied a strictly oligarchic form of government. In their city-states, the "people" were synonymous with the "citizens"—that is, the free-born inhabitants of the state, who rarely, if ever, exceeded one-tenth of its total population; all the rest were slaves and serfs who were not permitted to perform any but menial labors and—although they were frequently obliged to render military service—possessed no civic rights at all. Only the thin uppermost layer of the population—the "citizens"—had the right of active and passive franchise, and thus all political power was concentrated in their hands.
Viewed from this historical perspective, "democracy" as conceived in the modern West is infinitely nearer to the Islamic than to the ancient Greek concept of liberty; for Islam maintains that all human beings are socially equal and must, therefore, be given the same opportunities for development and self-expression. On the other hand, Islam makes it incumbent upon Muslims to subordinate their decisions to the guidance of the Divine Law revealed in the Quran and exemplified by the Prophet: an obligation which imposes definite limits on the community's right to legislate and denies to the "will of the people" that attribute of sovereignty which forms so integral a part of the Western concept of democracy. A tendency superficially similar to that of Islam can be discerned in the concept of "ideological" democracy prevalent in the USSR and other Communist states. There, as in Islam, an ideology is placed over and above the people's freedom to legislate for themselves; only within the framework of that ideology can the majority vote become effective.
However, as just mentioned, this similarity is only superficial: first, because Islam bases all its ideological concepts on a Divine Law which, to the believer, is ethically binding in an absolute, immutable sense, whereas the ideology of communism is admittedly the product of a human doctrine and is therefore subject to the most far-reaching amendments; and, second, because Islam makes the comprehension and interpretation of its Law dependent on the individual's knowledge and conscience alone and does not force him to accept interpretations by any other individual or organized body as morally binding. (Notwithstanding the frequent violations of this principle in the course of Muslim history, the teachings of Islam are unequivocal on this subject.)
From the foregoing it is evident that even in the West the terms "democracy" and "democratic liberties" can be and are being used in widely divergent connotations. Their application—either in an affirmative or in a negative sense—to the political ideology of Islam necessarily produces an atmosphere of vagueness and, with it, a tendency to juggle with words.
The same can be said of many other sociopolitical terms which play a genuine—that is, historically warranted—role in Western thought, but are extremely equivocal with reference to Islamic ideology. One could, for example, assert (as some modern Muslim writers do) that Islam is "socialistic" in its tendencies because it aims at a state of affairs which would ensure to all citizens equality of opportunity, economic security, and an equitable distribution of national wealth; however, one could maintain with the same degree of assurance that Islam is opposed to socialism if it is taken to imply (as Marxian socialism undoubtedly does) a rigid regimentation of all social life, the supremacy of economics over ethics, and the reduction of the individual to the status of a mere economic factor.
Even the question as to whether Islam amis at "theocracy" cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." We might say "yes" if by theocracy we mean a social system in which all temporal legislation flows, in the last resort, from what the community considers to be a Divine Law. But the answer must be an emphatic "no" if one identifies theocracy with the endeavor— so well known from the history of medieval Europe—to invest a priestly hierarchy with supreme political power: for the simple reason that in Islam there is no priesthood or clergy and, consequently, no institution equivalent to the Christian Church (that is, an organized body of doctrine and sacramental functions). Since every adult Muslim has the right to perform each and every religious function, no person or group can legitimately claim to possess any special sanctity by virtue of the religious functions entrusted to them. Thus, the term "theocracy" as commonly understood in the West is entirely meaningless within the Islamic environment.
In brief, it is extremely misleading to apply non-Islamic terms to Islamic concepts and institutions. The ideology of Islam has a social orientation peculiar to itself, different in many respects from that of the modern West, and can be successfully interpreted only within its own context and in its own terminology. Any departure from this principle invariably tends to obscure the attitude of Islamic Law toward many of the burning issues of our time.
Islamic Political Forms
The application of non-Islamic terminologies to Islamic concepts of state and government is, however, not the only pitfall in the way of a student of Islamic political law. Perhaps an even greater danger is the reliance of so many Muslims on "historical precedents" as possible guides for our future development.
In the preceding chapter I have stressed one of the basic requirements which any state must fulfill if it is to ensure happiness and well-being to the people that comprise it: namely, to make full allowance for man's social and intellectual evolution and thus avoid rigidity in the concept of political law. Looking back at the past history of Muslim states and at some of the popular, present-day notions regarding the forms and functions of an "ideal" Islamic state, we are able to discern just that element of rigidity which one must deem incompatible with the demands of a healthy social development. I am referring in this connection not merely to ancient Muslim works on political theory which, as a rule, reflect the political conditions obtaining during the 'Abbasid period and only too often display an eagerness to gratify the interests of the rulers of the time: I am referring, more particularly, to the idea prevailing among many Muslims, both in the past and in the present, that there could be but one form of state deserving the adjective "Islamic"—namely, the form manifested under the four Right-Guided Caliphs—and that any deviation from that model must necessarily detract from the "Islamic" character of the state. Nothing could be more erroneous than this idea.
If we examine objectively the political ordinances of Quran and Sunnah, we find that they do not lay down any specific form of state: that is to say, the shari'ah does not prescribe any definite pattern to which an Islamic state must conform, nor does it elaborate in detail a constitutional theory. The political law emerging from the context of Quran and Sunnah is, nevertheless, not an illusion. It is very vivid and concrete inasmuch as it gives us the clear outline of a political scheme capable of realization at all times and under all conditions of human life. But precisely because it was meant to be realized at all times and under all conditions, that scheme has been offered in outline only and not in detail. Man's political, social, and economic needs are time-bound and, therefore, extremely variable. Rigidly fixed enactments and institutions could not possibly do justice to this natural trend toward variation; and so the shariah does not attempt the impossible. Being a Divine Ordinance, it duly anticipates the fact of historical evolution, and confronts the believer with no more than a very limited number of broad political principles; beyond that, it leaves a vast field of constitution-making activity, of governmental methods, and of day-to-day legislation to the ijtihad of the time concerned.